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ROBERT S. STEVENS
It seems to have become customary to launch a new dis-
cussion of the doctrine of ultra vires upon a wave of apology.
To apologize by saying that the writer has new ideas to offer
would be to display both temerity and ignorance, for which
there is no apology. Let it be explained, therefore, that the
purpose of these pages is three-fold: first, to remind those
interested that two organizations now exist which can assist
in solving the perplexities of the ultra vires problems; seconid,
to present the writer's views as to what these bodies can do
and what solution they should adopt; third, to urge others to
present their views as to what should be done to the end that
the opportunities that exist may be availed of and that the
solution finally presented may be not only sound but one that
meets with general approval.
The organizations whose duty it should be to find a solution
of the ult]ra vires problem, a problem as to which "the au-
thorities are in utter confusion," ' "a state of hopeless and in-
extricable confusion," 2 are two, The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and The American Law
Institute.
The first tentative draft of an "Act to Make Uniform the
Law of Business Corporations" was presented to the Confer-
ence in 1909. The ninth tentative draft was considered by the
Conference at its session in 1924, and it is likely that a tenth
draft will come before the Conference at its next session in
'2 IACHEN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS (190S) §§ 1021, 104S.
2 Thompson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in Relation to Private Corpo-
rations (1894) 28 Am. L. Rsv. 376.
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the summer of 1927. No one of the first eight drafts took
the ultra vires doctrine into account. In spite of the periodic
revisions of corporation statutes, only one state legislature, that
of Vermont, seems to have made a conscious effort to affect the
ultra vires problem through legislation.3 If the proposed revi-
sion of the Ohio corporation law, now being drafted by a com-
mittee of the Ohio State Bar Association, becomes law, another
state will have dealt with the ultra vires problem legislatively.
Should the ultra vires doctrine be left entirely to the Ameri-
can Law Institute for a restatement? To what extent is reme-
dial legislation appropriate or desirable? It seems obvious that
so far as the ultra vires dilemma is of legislative creation the
key to its solution is in the hands of the legislature. A re-
statement may influence the courts in shaping case law but can-
not do more. The courts cannot effect a complete cure without
usurping the function of the legislature. 4  One needs only to
be reminded of the Ashbury case - and the Central Transporta-
tion Company case 6 to recall that the doctrine of limited capa-
city was the result of a judicial interpretation of legislative in-
tention. In the decision of the lower court in the Ashbury case 7
Lord Blackburn had reasoned that, since at common law a cor-
poration had the capacity of a group of natural persons, that
is, a capacity to do an unauthorized or forbidden act,8 so a cor-
poration created by legislative act should have the same general
capacity to do an unauthorized or forbidden act, unless it were
clear from a reading of the statute that the legislature had ex-
pressly or impliedly given it only limited capacity. The statute,
being in derogation of the common law, should be strictly con-
3 Vt. Gen. Laws (1917) §§ 4919, 4923. These provisions were intro-
duced upon a revision of the General Corporation Law in 1915. Vt. Laws
1915, No. 141, § 15: "Authority of corporations. A corporation shall have
authority to do any act which is necessary or proper to accomplish its
purposes, and which is not repugnant to law. Without limiting or en-
larging the effect of this general grant of authority, it is hereby specif-
ically provided that it may have a corporate seal," etc. For an additional
portion of this section, see infra note 124.
4 See 2 MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 1058.
5 Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 653, 673,
677, 684 (1875).
6 Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 53, 11
Sup. Ct. 478, 486 (1890) : "The necessary conclusion from these premises
is, that the contract sued on was unlawful and void, because it was beyond
the powers conferred upon the plaintiff by the legislature, and because it
involved an abandonment by the plaintiff of its duty to the public."
7 Riche v. Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co., L. R. 9 Ex. 224, 261-
265 (1874).
8 For an interesting and helpful application of the Hohfeldian concepts
of "privilege" and "power" to the ultra vires problem, see Harno, Privi-
leges and Powers of a Corporation and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires (1925)
35 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 13.
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strued. Lord Haldane, in the Boamiza Creek case,0 pointed out
that this reasoning of Lord Blackburn was held by the House
of Lords in the Ashzbnry case"" to be erroneous:
"it is wrong, in answering the question what powers the corpo-
ration possesses when incorporated exclusively by statute, to
start by assuming that the Legislature meant to create a com-
pany with a capacity resembling that of a natural person, such
as a corporation created by charter would have at common law,
and then to ask whether there are words in the statute which
take away the incidents of such a corporation. . . Such a
creature, where its entire existence is derived from the statute,
will have the incidents which the common law would attach if,
but only if, the statute has by its language gone on to attach
them. . . . The question is simply one of interpretation of
the words used. . . . The language may be such as to show
an intention to confer on the corporation the general capacity
which the common law ordinarily attaches to corporations
created by charter. In such a case a construction like that
adopted by Blackburn, J., will be the true one."
How simple, therefore, would it be for the legislature, express-
ing itself in no uncertain terms, to relegate the remaining ves-
tige of that false conception that the articles of incorporation
state "the ambit and extent of vitality and power which by law
are given to the corporation," "I to destroy the very premise of
the deduction that "the objection to the [ultra vires] contract
is, not merely that the corporation ought not to have made it, but
that it could not make it," 12 and to establish a distinction, which
has the virtue of being true, between capacity to act and au-
thority to act, recognizing that the incorporated group, like the
individual human being, or an unincorporated group, has the
capacity to do an unauthorized or even an illegal act. 3
The decision in the Bonanzza Creck case14 made it clear that
9 Bonanza Creek Gold Alining Co., Ltd. v. Rex [1916] 1 A. C. 566, 577-578.
10 Supra note 5.
1 "Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche, smpra note 5, at 670.
12 Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Car Co, s pr-a note 6, at 59,
11 Sup. Ct. at 488.
i3 This distinction was established by the Vermont statute, vpra note 3,
by substituting "authority" for the usual expression "power." The Hoh-
feldian nomenclature would be "power" and "privilege" rather than "capa-
city" and "authority." See Harno, op. cit. svpra note S. Corastocl;r C. J.,
in Bissell v. Michigan Southern R. R., 22 N. Y. 258, at 26 (18CO) cays:
"In the same sense, natural persons are under the restraints of law, but
they may transgress the law, and when they do so they are responsible
for their acts. From this consequence corporations are not, in my judg-
ment, wholly exempt. . . . Thus like moral and sentient beings, they
may and do act in opposition to the intention of their creator, and they
ought to be accountable for such acts." See also Selden, J., at 283.
14 Supra note 9.
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Canada had two kinds of corporations, those created by letters-
patent which had- the general capacity possessed at common law
by corporations created by royal charter, and companies incor-
porated by registering memoranda of association with the con-
sequent limited capacity of legislatively created corporations.
Accordingly, many of the Provincial Companies acts were
amended so as to extend to all corporations, however formed, "the
general capacity which the Common Law ordinarily attaches to
Corporations created by Charter." 2-
Another prop of the ultra vires structure for the removal of
which legislation would seem appropriate, if not necessary, is
the rule that all persons dealing with a corporation are held to
have notice of the charter limitations on corporate authority.
This aspect of the problem is to be considered later.
The American Law Institute has authorized a "Restatement
of the Law of Business Associations." The work has been com-
menced in the field of incorporated associations. It will have
to include a restatement of the doctrine of ultra vires, unless it
should be concluded that the problem is one that can be solved
only through remedial legislation, and that a solution worked
through the courts would be effected only by judicial legislation.
It is doubtful if such a conclusion will be reached by anyone.
The cure of the ultra vires ailment calls for some legislation
and much restatement by the courts. The present opportuni-
ties should not be lost by the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute. It is
submitted that neither can perfect a cure without the co-opera-
tion of the other. However, before the surgeon applies the knife
or the physician prescribes the remedy, each must diagnose the
malady and regard its history.
THE CONDITION OF AMERICAN LAW RELATING TO ULTRA VIRES
One eminent writer has said that "to attempt to unravel the
tangle so as to show what rules of law are adopted in each state
would be a protracted, if not impossible, task." 10 In spite of
'15 Ont. Stat. 1916, c. 35, § 6. See also Alta. Stat. 1916, c. 26, § 1; Man.
Stat. 1917, c. 12, § 1; 1 Sask. Rev. Stat. (1920) c. 76, § 14. For the effect
of the Ontario act, see Edwards v. Blackmore, 42 Ont. L. Rep. 105, 42
Dom. L. Rep. 280 (1918). See also MASTEN AND FRASER, COMPANY LAW
(2d ed. 1920) 88-93; Thompson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in Relation
to Incorporated Companies in Canada (1920) 40 CAN. L. T. 993; Thompson,
Are Joint Stock Companies Common Law Corporations (1922) 42 CAN. L.
T. 143, 245, 302; Garrett, Bonanza Creek Case and Common Law Corpora-
tions (1922) 42 CAN. L. T. 433; Garrett, Companies and Dominion and
Provincial Laws (1922) 42 CAN. L. T. 466, 478-487; Mulvey, Common Law
Companies (1925) 10 PROCEEDINGS CAN. BAR ASS'N, 176.
26 2 MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1021.
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this condition of apparent confusion, there are certain proposi-
tions as to which there is substantial unanimity among courts,
and certain propositions which have the support of a majority
of the American jurisdictions. A brief resume of these propo-
sitions follows.
Proposition L Even when a corporation assumes to cizg.gc
in an ultru vires business, responsibility will attach to thc co;-
poration for torts committed by its agents, actbig vwithin thcir
authwrity, in the course of that business. There may be said to
be substantial unanimity among the American jurisdictions in
support of this proposition.27 The decisions to the contrary may
be explained upon one of two grounds:
First: That a corporation, lacking the capacity to conduct a
given business, lacks the capacity to commit a tort as incident to
the conduct of that business.5 Certainly, the view that a cor-
poration lacks the capacity to do an ultra vires act logically
compels this result as to torts. On the other hand, is not the
fact that the overwhelming weight of American authority ina-
poses responsibility upon the corporation for torts committed
ultra vires a cogent repudiation of the lack of capacity doctrine?
Even the Supreme Court has said in a non-contract case:
"But the argument is unsound that whatever is done by a
corporation in excess of the corporate powers, as defined by its
charter, is as though it was not done at all. . . . The truth
is, that, with the great increase in corporations in very recent
times, and in their extension to nearly all the business transac-
tions of life, it has been found necessary to hold them responsible
for acts not strictly within their corporate powers, but done in
their corporate name, and by corporation officers who were com-
petent to exercise all the corporate powers. When such acts
are not founded on contract, but are arbitrary exercises of power
in the nature of torts, or are quasi-crininal, the corporation may
be held to a pecuniary responsibility for them to the party in-
jured." 19
"7For a collection of authorities see 2 BMAcHEN, op. cit. -zp;a note 1, §
1072; 14A C. J. 769; 5 FLnTCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATION LAw (1917)
§ 3339; Hildebrand, Torts in Ultra Vires Undcrtakings (1922) 1 Trx. L.
REv. 52.
Is Weckler v. First Nat'l Bank, 42 Md. 581, 595 (1875) (false repre-
sentations inducing sale of securities).
"9 Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U. S. 256, 260, 6 Sup. Ct. 1055, 105S
(1886) (liability of municipal corporation for tax on liquors distilled by
it. In New York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. '0, 49-50
(1865) it is said: "A corporation is liable to the same extent and under
the same circumstances as a natural person for the consequences of its
wrongful acts, and will be held to respond in a civil action at the suit
of an injured party for every grade and description of forcible, malicious
or negligent tort or wrong which it commits, however foreign to its na-
ture or beyond its granted powcrs the wrongful transaction may be."
In New York, L. E. & W. Ry. v. Haring, 47 N. J. L. 137, 138 (1385) the
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Second: Another ground for decisions contrary to Proposition
I is that the tort in question was so intimately connected with an
ultra vires contract that to permit recovery in a tort action
would be to permit an evasion of the rule which denies a right
of recovery upon such a contract.20  Resort need not be had to
this reasoning in a jurisdiction which insists that a corporation,
lacking the capacity to conduct a business, lacks the capacity to
commit the tort involved in the conduct of that business. But,
conceding that the defense of ultra vires may be interposed in
a cdntract action for reasons other than want of capacity to
make the contract,21 it is proper to inquire if the same reasons
do not justify the interposition of the defense in a tort action
arising out of the same transaction. If, for example, in a suit
by A against a common carrier upon a contract of carriage made
ultra vires, A will be told that he cannot recover because he is
charged with notice of the limitations upon corporate authority,
then it seems reasonable that A should be met with the same
obstacle when he sues the carrier in tort for the negligent
performance of the obligation arising out of contract. If, how-
ever, we should conclude that it is unreasonable to charge one
voluntarily dealing with a corporation with notice of the limita-
tions upon its authority, this basis of distinction between torts
which arise out of contract and those which do not, would cease
to exist.2 2  It seems sufficient to say that the overwhelming
weight of American authority supports the view that, whatever
may be the local rule as to ultra vires contracts, ultra vires is no
defense in an action of tort.23
court says: "It would indeed be an anomalous result in legal science
if a corporation should be permitted to set up that inasmuch as a branch
of the business prosecuted by. it was wrongful, therefore all the special
wrongs done to individuals in the course of it were remediless." Nat'l
Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699, 702 (1879), has this dictum: "Corporations
are liable for every wrong they commit, and in such cases the doctrine of
ultra vires has no application?' Ace: Panama R. R. v. Curran, 256 Fed.
768 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919).
202 MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1072. Gunn v. Central R. R., 74
Ga. 509 (1885). Contra: New York L. E. & W. R. R. v. Haring, supra
note 19; Bissell v. Michigan Southern R. R., supra note 13.
21nfra, pp. 309-34.
22 That one dealing voluntarily with a corporation ought not be auto-
ruatically charged with notice of the charter limitations on corporate powers,
see infra, pp. 321-28.
23 Supra note 17. Two suggestions as to methods of reconciling the rule
of corporate responsibility for ultra vires torts with the rules applying
to ultra vires contracts have been made. First, the damage re-
sulting from the tortious act is an existing fact, and the corporation's
responsibility is to be governed by the principle applicable to
ultra vires contracts which have been executed on one side. Zinc Car-
bonate Co. v. First Nat'1 Bank, 103 Wis. 125, 79 N. W. 229 (1899). Sec-
ondly, we are to look to the legislative intention in limiting corporate au-
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In support of Proposition I as formulated are those decisions
which hold that a corporation is not responsible when the tort
in question was committed by an agent who was at the time
acting outside the scope of the authority conferred upon him
by the corporation.2 4 Can one quarrel with decisions vhich ex-
onerate a corporation from responsibility upon the basis of this
reasoning? If the act, resulting in injury to a third party, is one
not within the authority conferred upon the actor by the cor-
poration, then we need not go further and inquire whether the
act is one that the corporation lacked capacity to do, and, there-
fore, could not authorize or ratify. But it is submitted that
even if the act is ultra vires, that will not prevent the corpora-
tion from becoming responsible for the consequences of that
act, provided it was done with the authority or ratification of the
corporation. Under such circumstances, it is as true to say that
thority, and "it is impossible to suppose that the Legislature intended
those companies who were wrongfully (i. e., ultra vires) working steamncr
to be in a better position than those who ware rightfully working them;
and the Act should not be so construed if the words permit of any other
construction." Lord Blackburn in Doolan v. Iidland Ry., L. R. 2 A. C.
792, 806 (1877). See also Oregonian Ry. v. Oregon Ry., 22 Fed. 245
(1884) where the legal disability of the corporation, "as in the case of a
minor, is a defense personal to the party who is under it, and cannot be
taken advantage of by another." This case is approved in BIGcLOw, Es-
TOPPEL (6th ed. 1913) 501.
24 "In other words, the only application of the doctrine of ,ltira vircs to
liability of corporations ex delicto is in showing that the alleged tortious
act was not committed within the scope of authority of the officer or
agent who was at fault." 2 LCHEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 1072.
9 . a corporation is liable for the torts of its agents, to the came
extent as an individual under similar circumstances; and . . . the fact that
a corporation was not authorized by its charter to commit a toit is no
defense in an action by the party injured." 2 Momkwrz, PrJVATz Conrm-
TIONS (2d ed. 1886) § 730.
Searle v. First Nat'l Bank, 2 Walk. 395 (Pa. 18S5) held that though the
act was ultra vires, the plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury on the
question of whether the cashier's act was ratified by the corporate officers.
The jury found no ratification. The cases are very numerous in accord.
See New York, L. E. & W. R. R. v. Haring, supra note 19; New York, N. H.
& H. R. R. v. Schuyler, supra note 19; Start v. Nat'l Newspaper AsS'n, 222
S. W. 870 (Mo. 1920).
In Basil v. Spratt, 44 Ont. L. Rep. 155, 45 Dom. L. Rep. 551 (1918)
the court said it would be willing to adopt the American doctrine of cor-
porate liability for ultra vires torts, but in this case finds no eddcnce of
authority conferred upon the agent to act on behalf of the corporation.
In Union Colliery Co. v. Queen, 31 Can. Sup. Ct. 31 (1900) there is a
dictum that a corporation should be held criminally responsible for a
crime committed in the course of an ultra vires undertaking. Cf. Banbury
v. Bank [1919] A. C. 626 and Stevens v. Merchants Bank, 30 Blan. Rep. 46
(1919) and the attack upon these decisions by Thompson, Fra-z:', of the
Law (1920) 40 CAN. L. T. 361. See also Whaley v. O'Grady, 22 Man. Rep.
379, 4 Dom. L. Rep. 485 (1912).
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the corporation has done the act, though an unpermitted (i. e.
ultra vires) act, as it is to say that a natural person has com-
mitted a tort or crime when he is held to responsibility for the
authorized, but tortious or illegal, act of his agent. The Hoh-
feldians would say that the corporation, like the individual, has
the power, though not the privilege, of bringing itself into new
legal relations with another.2
In conclusion, then, Proposition I might be stated in this al-
ternative form: A corporation may not, in order to escape re-
sponsibility for the tortious acts of its agents, show that they
were done in connection with a transaction beyond the scope of
corporate authority, but may show that such acts were done in
connection with a transaction beyond the scope of the authority
conferred by the corporation upon its agent.20 The question how
and when authority may be found to have been conferred by
the corporation upon the agent, or ratification of his acts given,
is postponed for subsequent discussion.
2 7
Proposition H. Even though a corporation has acted outside
the scope of its authority in taking or holding title to property,
the validity of its title cannot be questioned on the ground that
the corporation was without authority, or exceeded its authority,
in taking or holding the property. The American authorities
are unanimous in support of this proposition. 28 It is obviously
irreconcilable with the theory of limited capacity to hold that
it has acquired a title which it could not acquire. The proposi-
tion as stated is intended to be broad enough to preclude an
attack upon the title (a) by the state, (b) by either party to a
grant to or by the corporation, and (c) by a stranger to the
transaction by which the corporation acquired or disposed of the
property. There are a few states which have mortmain statutes
permitting the state to compel a forfeiture of land held by a
corporation without authority. 29 In such states, however, it is
held that though the title is subject to forfeiture by the state,
the corporation's title is to be considered valid until forfeiture
25 Harno, op. cit. supra note 8, at 18.
26 BRICE, ULTRA VMRES (3d ed. 1893) 439, states that the American cases
have established the rule that "if a corporation or its managing body
bona fide believing that a particular transaction is within its powers direct
an act which turns out ultra vires, still the corporation is liable to any
person thereby damnified."
27 The meaning of "corporate act," and the application of the principles
of the law of Agency in determining when an act is a corporate act are
considered at length later, infra pp. 329-34.
28 14A C. J. 319; 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 17, at § 1561; Warren,
Executed Ultra Vires Transactions (1910) 23 HARV. L. REv. 495; Parks,
Ultra Vires Transactions (1923) 24 Mo. L. BuLL. (No. 8) 3, 15.
29 Iowa Code 1924, §§ 10214, 10216, 10218 (corporations organized under
laws of a foreign country or domestic corporations more than one-third
of whose shares are owned by non-resident aliens), Ky. Stat. (Carroll's
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and the state's right to forfeit will be lost if the corporation con-
veys the property before confiscation proceedings are com-
menced30 In the great majority of states, where the unauthor-
ized taking or holding of land is treated like any other ultra vires
act, the state's remedy is to institute a quo warranto proceed-
ing which may result in a forfeiture of the charter, or in an
order that unless the corporation dispose of the property, the
charter will be forfeited.3 1 This doctrine that if a corporation
takes property for a purpose not authorized by its charter, it
thereby opens itself to an attack by the state in a proceeding to
forfeit the charter but that the validity of its title is subject
neither to a direct nor a collateral attack "has the salutary effect
of assuring the security of titles and of avoiding the injurious
consequences which would otherwise result." "
Proposition III. Even though a corporation has acted outside
the scope of its authority in 2zvking a contract, if the contract
has been fully performed on both sides, it will stand as a founda-
tion of rights acquired under it. The American authorities are
substantially unanimous in support of this proposition,03 but the
6th ed. 1922) Const. § 192, Stat. § 567; Blinn. Gen. Stat. (1923) S 077-
8080; 2 Miss. Ann. Code (Hemingway, 1917) § 4075 (forfeit charter ane
land held in excess of limit); Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) §§ 56S7-8 (cor-
porations other than those organized under the laws of Nebraslza, and
Nebraska corporations a majority of whose board of directors are alicns) ;
1 N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) §§ 4503-4 (religious and charitable corpo-
rations); 1 Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) Const. art. XXII, § 2, 2 ibid. § 11321;
Pa. Stat. (West, 1920) §§ 10233-10243, 2 Pa. Digest (Purdon's 13th ed.
1907) 1476, 8 ibid. (Supp. 1921) 8287; Vt. Gen. Laws (1917) § 4922
(religious and charitable corporations). See also 3 FLETCHER, op. cit.
supra note 17, at § 1566.
3o State v. Benevolent Investment and Relief Ass'n, 107 Okla. 228, 232
Pac. 35 (1925) noted in (1925) 10 CoRN L. Q. 501.
31 See authorities collected in 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 17, at §
1524 and 5 ibid. § 3270. In a qzo warranto proceeding, it may be proper
to subject the corporation to a money judgment by way of fine or damages
for breach of its contract with the state. Standard Oil Co. v. DliSzouri,
224 U. S. 270, 32 Sup. Ct. 406 (1912). Courts may exercise their dis-
cretion in deciding whether a corporation ought to be dissolved for doing
unauthorized acts, whether it should be ousted from its charter unlezo
it refrain from ultra vires action, or ousted only from the authority
wrongfully assumed. 2 BMonA."rz, op. cit. sapra note 24, at § 1023; 3
CooK, CORPORkTioNS (8th ed. 1923) § 633; 14A C. J. 1094. For an argu-
ment against the propriety of proceedings on the part of the state to
forfeit a charter for ultra vires acts, see Lilienthal, Non-Public Corpo-
rations and Ultra Vires (1898) 11 HARv. L. REv. 387.
3 2 Kerfoot v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 218 U. S. 281, 237, 31 Sup.
Ct. 14, 15 (1910) ; 2 MloRAWETZ, op. cit. supra note 24, at § G78.
3 See authorities collected in 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 17, at §
1559; 14A C. J. 319; 2 MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at §§ 1013-54;
Warren, op. cit. supra note 28; Parks, op. cit. a,.pra note 28; City of
Williston v. Ludowese, 208 N. W. 82 (N. D. 1926). "If such a contract
has been completely executed on both sides, the courts will ordinarily re-
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processes of reasoning by which the result is reached are varying
and conflicting.
Propositions II and III are sometimes merged as one, the ac-
quisition of property being treated as one instance of a con-
tract fully executed. Obviously, however, the unauthorized ac-
quisition of property may have resulted otherwise than by
contract, or the contract which has been fully performed may
not have been one for the purchase of property. Complications
arise in applying the rule enunciated in Proposition III owing
to the difficulty of determining whether a given transaction, e. g.,
a lease,34 a mortgage,35 the acquisition of shares of another cor-
poration,38 or the purchase of a note 37 is executed or executory.
Proposition IV. When a corporation has acted outside the
scope of its authority in making a contract, either the corpora.
tion or the other party thereto may set that fact up as a com-
plete defense to any action brought either at law or in equity
upon the contract, provided the contract is wholly executory on
both sides. The unanimity of the American courts in support
of this proposition is broken only by the statement of the Kan-
sas court: "that only the state can challenge the validity of
acts done under color of a corporate charter, [which] if ac-
cepted, must necessarily protect an executory contract from col-
lateral attack, equally with one that has been executed. The
court is convinced of the soundness of the view that in the ab-
sence of special circumstances affecting the matter neither party
to even an executory contract should be allowed to defeat its en-
forcement by the plea of ultra vires." 3
fuse any relief to either. The usurpation is at an end. Each party has
received from the other what he bargained for. Neither of them has
any cause to complain. The contract has ceased to be a living thing. The
courts will leave it in its grave," Alabama Cons. Coal Co. v. Baltimore
Trust Co., 197 Fed. 347, 358 (D. Md. 1912).
34 For a collection of authorities and a discussion of positions taken by
the Supreme Court, see 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 17, at §§ 1551, 1587.
3 Cases collected in 3 FIErCHEsR, op. cit. supra note 17, at §§ 1571, 1575.
36 A corporation, purchasing shares ultra vires, gets a good title which
it can sell. Bigbee & W. R. Packet Co. v. Moore, 121 Ala. 379, 25 So.
602 (1899) and dictum in Holmes & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Holmes & Wessell
Co., 127 N. Y. 252, 27 N. E. 831 (189f). But a corporation, purchasing
shares ultra vires, is not responsible as a shareholder. California Bank v.
Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, 17 Sup. Ct. 831 (1897).
37 The maker of a note can not object that a corporate holder purchased
the note ultra vires. Prescott Nat'l Bank v. Butler, 157 Mass. 548, 32 N. E.
909 (1893). Neither can the obligor of a non-negotiable chose in action
defend on the ground that the plaintiff corporation's purchase was ultra
vires. John Farwell Co. v. Wolf, 96 Wis. 10, 70 N. W. 289 (1897).
Contra: Pueblo v. Shutt Co., 28 Colo. 524, 67 Pac. 162 (1901).
38 Harris v. Independence Gas Co., 76 Kan. 750, 763, 92 Pac. 1123, 1127
(1907). "There is somewhat new and growing doctrine, that whether a
corporation has acted in excess of its granted powers, or in face of an
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Proposition V. A non-assenting shareholder, inless estopped
or barred by his laches, mnay be granted an injunction to restrain
an act threatened to be done on behalf of a corporation when
such act would be beyond the scope of corporate authority. "The
very basis of the contract of membership in a corporation is
that its funds shall be devoted only to the purposes of its busi-
ness, and any diversion of them to any other or different pur-
pose may always be enjoined by every shareholder." 2 It would
seem that the state might also be permitted to secure an injunc-
tion against threatened ultra vires action in breach of its con-
tract with the incorporators, but the authorities are divided upon
the question, strong support being given to the view that the
state's remedy is by a quo warranto proceeding and not by in-
junction.-, Forestalling threatened ultra vires action is prefer-
able to a forfeiture of the charter for past ultra vires action, and
in practice the state's remedy by quo warranto is sometimes
made to serve injunctively.
4'
Proposition VI. The comnission by a corporation of an act
outside the scope of the authority conferred upon it does nzot, of
itself, put an end to corporate existence, but furnishes a groud
for the forfeiture of the charter of the corporation, or for oust-
ing it froin the exercise of the untauthorized powers, upon the
state's application in a quo warranto proceedinZg. 
2
Thus through that haze of "hopeless confusion" we are able
to discern and reproduce in outline at least six propositions
which the American authorities support with substantial una-
nimity. Eliminating these, the field of conflict is seen to be
expressed or implied statutory prohibition, is one which cannot be raised
in litigation between it and a private party, but can only be raised by
the State," City Coal & Ice Co. v. Union Trust Co., 140 Va. 600, G07-3, 12.
S. E. 697, 699 (1924). Warren, E:xccutory Ultra Vircs Transaction, (1911)
24 HARV. L. REV. 534; Parks, op. cit. supra note 28, at 7.
39 2 AlACHEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 1153.
40 The state cannot obtain an injunction: Att'y Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co.,
2 Johns. Ch. 371 (N. Y. 1817); Att'y Gen. v. Tudor Ice Co., 101 Mas .
239 (1870); 3 CooK, op. cit. supra note 31, at § 635; 3. FLurHcX,, op. cit.
supra note 17, at § 1524. An injunction at the suit of the state is proper:
Trust Co. v. State, 109 Ga. '36, 35 S. E. 323 (1900); Columbian Athlec
Club v. State, 143 Ind. 98, 40 N. E. 914 (1895) ; State v. Minnczota Threshcr
Co., 40 Minn. 213, 41 N. W. 1020 (ISS9) dictum; Madison v. Madizon Gas
Co., 129 Wis. 249, 108 N. W. 65 (1906); 7 R. C. L. 612. Jurisdiction t9
enjoin at the suit of the state may be conferred upon equity courts, c. y.,
Sherman Anti-trust Act, 26 Stat. 209, (1899) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) §
8823; see also People v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269, 279, 32 N. E. 51, 5G (1892)
where it is said, "'the proceedings at law by quo warranto or scire facias
are so dilatory that much mischief will generally be done before judgment
can be obtained, and are so ex-pensive that a summary remedy seems abzo-
lutely necessary.'"
41 Supra note 31.
42 Supra notes 31, 40 and 41.
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limited to disputes arising out of ultra vires contracts which are
neither wholly executory nor wholly executed. The cases falling
within this field are of two types: (1) contracts which have
been fully performed on one side; (2) contracts which have been
but partially performed on one or both sides.
As is well known, there is a distinct line of cleavage which
divides the decisions of cases in this field into two general
groups:
1. The first group is founded on the reasoning that the ultra
vires acts of a corporation cannot result in a contract; that,
therefore, if the corporation and the party dealing with it have
performed acts upon the footing of a non-existent contract, no
action will lie as for breach, or specific performance of a con-
tract, but the facts may present the basis for a quasi-contractual
recovery of the value of the benefits conferred by such per-
foinance'.
2. The second group results from the contrary premise that
the legal consequences of a contract may be predicated upon the
acts of a corporation though ultra vires, and that if such con-
tract has been performed by one of the parties, or partially by
both of the -parties, that contract will stand as the basis of an
action, either at law or in equity, to secure damages or compel
performance to the extent of the plaintiff's performance.
The jurisdictions are by no means evenly divided between these
two groups. In the first are the federal courts and the courts
of the states of Alabama, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Nebraska, New Hampshire and Tennessee.43 The balance
of the state courts fall into the second group. This alignment
43 United States: Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Car Co., supra
note 6. Alabama: Chewacla Lime-Works v. Dismukes, Frierson & Co., 87
Ala. 344, 6 So. 122 (1888); Wiley Fertilizer Co. v. Carroll, 202 Ala. 335,
80 So. 417 (1918). Illinois: National Home Ass'n v. Home Savings Bank,
181 Ill. 35, 54 N. E. 619 (1899); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kastor, 273 Ill.
332, 112 N. E. 988 (1916). Maine: Brunswick Gas Light Co. v. United
Gas Co., 85 Me. 532, 27 Atl. 525 (1893). Maryland: Western Maryland
R. R. v. Blue Ridge Co., 102 Md. 307, 62 Atl. 351 (1905). Massachusetts:
Davis v. Old Colony R. R., 131 Mass. 258 (1881); Williams v. Johnson,
208 Mass. 544, 95 N. E. 90 (1911); Nowell v. Equitable Trust Co., 249
Mass. 585, 144 N. E. 749 (1924) (language used in the opinion is ambig-
uous and it is suggested that the defense of ultra vires must be retained
as to trust companies, whatever the rule may be as to general business
corporations). Nebraska: Simmons v. Farmers' Union Co-op. Ass'n, 208
N. W. 144 (Neb. 1926) (the opinion contains ambiguous statements).
New Hampshire: Downing v. Mt. Washington Co., 40 N. H. 230 (1860);
Norton v. Derry Nat'l Bank, 61 N. H. 589 (1882). Tennessee: Marble Co.
v. Harvey, 92 Tenn. 115, 20 S. W. 427 '(1892); Leonhardt v. Small, 117
Tenn. 153, 96 S. W. 1051 (1906). Vermont: The similar rule formerly
obtaining in that state because of Metropolitan Stock Exchange v. Nat'l
Bank, 76 Vt. 303, 57 Atl. 101 (1903) has been changed by the statutory
provisions quoted supra note 3 and infra note 124.
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is of the utmost significance. It shows not only that the majority
of all American jurisdictions fall into the second group, but also
that better than eighty per cent of the statc courts have chosen
company in the second group. Assuming for the moment that
reason and practical experience give equal support to each of the
views, then, it is submitted: (1) a restatement of the law of
ultra vires, intended to influence judicial decision, should give
due regard to this judicial vote between the two views; (2) a
uniform corporation act, prepared for adoption by state legis-
latures, and aimed at bringing uniformity rather than reforma-
tion in state law, should reflect the views of eighty per cent of
the states rather than the views of twenty per cent of them.
Incidentally, it is to be observed that, to the extent that the
ultra vires doctrine is dependent upon statutory construction, a
revision of state legislation will be corrective of federal deci-
sions involving the acts done on behalf of a corporation organ-
ized under state legislation.
The choice between two irreconcilable results should not be
made solely upon a consideration of the proportions of the pres-
ent judicial vote between them, if reason and practical experience
seem to command us to side with the minority. Where lies the
better reason and what is the'lesson of experience? Let us briefly
examine and consider the grounds advanced as justifying a
collateral attack upon the authority of a corporation to engage
in a particular transaction, and consider how they should be
disposed of in framing a restatement and in drafting corrective
legislation.
44
1. Is unautlorized corporate action illegal?
Whether ultra vires action is illegal depends upon how "ultra
vires" is defined. "In its proper sense, it denotes some act or
transaction on the part of a corporation which, although not
unlawful or contrary to public policy if done or executed by an
individual, is yet beyond the legitimate powers of the corpora-
tion as they are defined by the statute under which it is formed
or which are applicable to it, or by its charter or incorporation
paper." This definition of "ultra vires" found in Mlachen's not-
able work on Corporations 45 has also been adopted in Halsbury's
Laws of England. 6  Substituting the word "authority" for "le-
gitimate powers," the definition certainly accords with the gen-
eral understanding of the expression "ultra yires." By its very
terms, it excludes the quality of illegality from the act in ques-
tion, and makes the want of authority to do the act the sole
44 The analysis here followed is that adopted by Prof. C. E. Carpenter
in his article SIwuld the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discardcd (1923) 3
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 49, 57.
45 2 TACHEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 1012.
46 5 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (1910) 285.
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objection to it. In the Ashbury case, 47 Lord Cairns said, "I have
used the expressions extra vires and intra vires. I prefer either
expression very much to one which occasionally has been used
* * in other cases, the expression 'illegality.' . . . In a
case such as that which your Lordships have now to deal with,
it is not a question whether the contract sued upon involves that
which is malum prohibitum or malum in se, or is a contract con-
trary to public policy, and illegal in itself. . . . The question
is not as to the legality of the contract; the question is as to
the competency and power of the company to make the con-
tract."
Where an act on the part of a corporation would be illegal
or contrary to public policy if done by an individual, or is an
act which a corporation is expressly prohibited from doing, then
the consequences resulting from such illegal action should not
be, and are not, different from those resulting from similar acts
done by an individual. The rule that the law will not help
either party to an illegal contract, that it will give neither en-
forcement of, nor relief from such a contract, is demanded by
public policy as a method of discouraging and indirectly pre-
venting illegal conduct. "To dbny such persons damages, though
an equally guilty defendant therbby escapes punishment will
tend to diminish the number of illegal agreements." 4 But to
deny an innocent plaintiff affirmative relief when he has par-
tially performed the illegal contract, and to permit the defend-
ant to retain the fruits of his illegality will tend to augment
the number of such agreements. Therefore, the courts will
sometimes give affirmative relief to a party to an illegal con-
tract when they find that the giving of such relief will serve
the public interests. The party to whom the relief is given is
47 Supra note 5, at 672. "But the words illegal and void are elusive; it
is feared that they are frequently used like curse words to fill in where
other language fails," Harno, op. cit. supra note 8, at 24. "The word
'unlawful' as applied to contracts may mean either that it is unlawful in
that the corporation has not the power to make it conferred by its charter,
or it may mean that it is prohibited by the constitution or laws of the
state, or public policy or the common law. It may be said that the courts
of Kentucky have not held that the mere want of a grant of power to
make a contract by a corporation rendered the contract void, but upon the
contrary have adjudged rights based upon such contracts and permitted
them to be used as defenses and applied the doctrine of estoppel to them."
Hind v. Cook Co., 202 Ky. 526, 532, 260 S. W. 349, 351 (1924). In that
case it was found that the corporation had insured property in violation
of an express provision that no property should be insured which was out-
side the limits of the territory specified in the certificate of incorporation.
The application to ultra vires contracts of the rule that illegal contracts
cannot be enforced is comparatively modern. Tracy v. Talmage, 14 N. Y.
162, 179 (1856).
48 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1630.
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the instrument through whom the public is served. 5 That party
must be innocent of wrongdoing. To deny him relief, it is not
enough that he is particeps criminis, he must be also i par!
delicto. Even if persons dealing with a corporation are pre-
sumed to know the extent of corporate powers, "yet this is by
no means a safe rule by which to measure the moral delinquency
of the respective parties." 51'
The above reasoning would be sufficient to support the grant-
ing of affirmative relief to one who has innocently entered into a
contract which is ultra vires the defendant corporation. But
when we find that the federal courts permit the corporation to
recover in quasi-contract the value of the benefits conferred upon
the third party under the ultra vires contract, and that the
eighty per cent of the American jurisdictions which permit the
third party to recover in an action upon the partially executed
ultra vires contract also permit the corporation itself to recover
upon the contract, it must be concluded that the action in excess
of corporate authority is not so contrary to public policy as to
be visited with the consequences of illegal action. Ultra vires
action is not, therefore, illegal. ' Is it against public policy?
2. Is znathorized corporate action against public policy?
Of course, it is against public policy for a corporation to usurp
authority that has not been conferred upon it. This objection,
however, has less force when applied to private business corpo-
rations than when applied to municipal corporations, and it is
important to note that its application originated with reference
to the acts of municipal corporations and was then transferred
to the acts of private business corporations without any special
reference to the interests of the public.n2 Even if the ultra vires
action of private business corporations is against public policy,
still we have just seen that the law does not say that because
a contract is illegal, therefore, an action may not be main-
tained upon it. So the law should not say that because a con-
tract is ultra vires, therefore, it cannot be the foundation of
enforceable rights. As in the field of illegal contracts, so in the
field of ultra vires contracts, the real problem is to find the solu-
tion which will discourage offenses of usurping authority writh-
out working injustice. An indiscriminate sanction of the plea
of ultra vires might be subversive of justice due the plaintiff,
and, by immunizing the defendant from civil responsibility,
might encourage ultra vires conduct by reducing the risks at-
9 13 C. J. 497 et seq.
ro Tracy v. Talmage, supra note 47, at 188.
51 See the argument against illegality of ultra vires action in Carpenter,
op. cit. supra note 44, at 59.
52 City Coal & Ice Co. V. Union Trust Co., szpra note 38, at S0, 125 S. E.
at 698; 2 CooK, op. cit. supra note 31, at § 631.
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tendant upon such action. It matters not whether the corpora-
tion or the third party is the defendant in such a suit. "Public
policy is promoted by the discouragement of fraud and the
maintenance of the obligation of contracts, and to permit a les-
see of a corporation to escape the payment of rent by pleading
the incapacity of the corporation to make the lease, although
he has had the undisturbed enjoyment of the property, would be,
we think, most inequitable and unjust," said the New York
Court of Appeals in Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy.
5 3
Even the Supreme Court, which, when dealing with ultra vires
contracts, usually carries the doctrine of lack of capacity to its
ultimate conclusion, has said: "The doctrine of ultra vires,
whether invoked for or against a corporation, is not favored
in the law. It should never be applied where it will defeat the
ends of justice, if such a result can be avoided." 14 Similarly,
although the English authorities sanction the plea of ultra vires
in contract actions, yet in 1852, Lord St. Leonards was of the
opinion that, "nothing can be more indecent than for a great
company like this to allege, by way of defense, that a solemn
contract which they have entered into is void on the ground
of its not being within their powers, not from any mistake, mis-
apprehension, or subsequent accident, but because they thought
fit to enter into it, and meant to have the benefit of it, if it turned
out for their benefit, and to take advantage of the illegality in
case the contract should prove onerous, and they should desire
to get rid of it." 5 Upon the appeal of the same case before
the House of Lords, Lord St. Leonards again expressed his be-
lief that "the safety of men in their daily contracts requires that
this doctrine of ultra vires should be confined within narrow
bounds." 56
An analogous problem had to be solved by the courts in deal-
ing with de facto corporations. In Boyce v. Towsonton Station,,;
the Maryland court, deciding that the individual defendants could
not be estopped from denying that they were a corporation, rea-
sons thus: "Whilst denying its capacity upon any principle of
$ 151 N. Y. 24, 36, 45 N. E. 390, 393 (1896). The application of the
ultra vires doctrine was "found by experience in many cases to violate
that highest public policy, 'that corporations ought not to be upheld in
dishonesty any more than individuals; and that it is contrary to the
highest public policy for the judicial courts to sustain a corporation in
dishonesty by assisting it in repudiating its honest contracts,'" City Coal
& Ice Co. v. Union Trust Co., supra note 38, at 606, 125 S. E. at 698.
54 San Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96 U. S. 312, 315 (1877); Railway v. Mc-
Carthy, 96 U. S. 258 (1877). See also St. Avit v. Kettle River Co., 216
Fed. 872 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
55 Hawkes v. Eastern Counties Ry., 1 De G. M. & G. 737, 760 (1852).
56 Eastern Counties Ry v. Hawkes, 5 H. L. Cas. 331, 371 (1855).
5746 Md. 359, 373 (1876).
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estoppel, to make contracts dtra. vires, to bind itself; it would
not be consistent with that theory to recognize its existczce ad
libitum, according to the conduct of the parties concerned:'
If the incorporated associates cannot act as a unit outside the
limits of authorized corporate action, then surely associates who
assume to be incorporated, but are not, cannot act as a legal
unit.-8 But that decision in MKaryland was counteracted by stat-
ute,r" and in at least fifteen other states there are similar stat-
utes substantially to the effect that where individuals have at-
tempted to form a corporation formable under a statute of the
state, and have assumed to act as a corporate unit, the state
alone can inquire into their right to act as a unit."" The same
result has been reached by judicial decision in the federal courts
and in the overwhelming majority of state courts."' By statutory
provision, it has also become the accepted principle of the law
of England and that of many of the English colonies and do-
minions.r2
It is submitted that the logic in the Maryland court's reason-
ing was sound. If corporate effect will not be given to the acts
of associates acting outside the scope of corporate authority,
then corporate effect ought not to be given to the acts of associ-
ates who are not incorporated. The policy and reason which
demand the one result demand the other. In fact, the usurpa-
tion of corporate existence by individuals seems a more serious
offense than the usurpation of corporate authority by an exist-
ing corporation. The Maryland court in the same case says:
"It would be more reasonable to hold corporations to their con-
tracts, though ultra, vires, of which they have received the benefit,
5s In Bergeron v. Hobbs, 96 Wis. 641, 646, 71 N. W. 1056, 1057 (197)
Marshall, J., employed the converse reasoning that since no collateral at-
tack is permitted in an action upon an ultra vires contract, therefore, col-
lateral attack should not be permitted to test the de facto existcnce of a
corporation.
59 Md. Laws 1908, art XXIII, c. 240, § 6.
Go Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1913) § 2113; Calif. Cyc. Code (Kerr's 2d cd. 1920)
§ 358; 2 Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1920) §§ 4053, 4115; 2 Ga. Ann. Code (Parl:,
1914) § 2226; Iowa Code (1920) § 8401; Ky. Stat. (Carroll's 6th ed. 1922)
§ 566; 1 La. Ann. Rev. Stat. (Marr, 1915) § 1428; La. Laws 1914, Act
267, § 12; Nev. Rev. Laws (1912) § 1154; 1 N. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1913) § 4496; 2 Okla. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1921) § 5293; Or. Laws (Olsen,
1920) § 6858; 3 S. C. Code (1922) § 4306; 1 S. D. Rev. Code (1919) §
239; Tenn. Shannon's Code (Thompson, 1917) §§ 2026, 2031, 2064; Vt.
Gen. Laws (1917) § 4900.
61 Warren, Collateral Attack on, Incorporation (1906) 20 HARM. L. RE ..
456; (1907) 21 ibid. 305; Carpenter, De Facto Corporations (1912) 25 ibid.
623; 7 R. C. L. 60 et seq.; Kardo v. Adams, 231 Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 6th,
1916) reversing 222 Fed. 967 (N. D. Ohio, 1915).
62 Companies (Consolidation) Act (1908) 8 Edw. VII, c. 69, § 17; Do-
minion Companies Act, (1906) 2 Rev. Stat. Can., c. 79, §§ 4, 111; see
MASTEN & FRASER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 11; New Zealand Consol. Stat.
(1908) No. 26, § 26 (3), (4).
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or to prevent parties who have contracted with them, and re-
ceived the benefit therefrom, from defeating their liability, on
the ground of want of power in the corporation, . . . than
to hold that corporations should be deemed to have existence,
because they had so held themselves out." 03
Applying the same logical method of reasoning employed by
the Maryland court, will it not have to be conceded that if the
law does now permit unincorporated individuals, under certain
extenuating circumstances, to act as if they were a legal unit,
then it is even more reasonable, under similarly extenuating cir-
cumstances, to give legal effect to the acts of a corporation,
even when such acts are outside the scope of authorized corpo-
rate action?
In dealing with de facto corporations, the extenuating cir-
cumstances are: (1) a statute under which the kind of corpora-
tion attempted to be formed might have been formed de jure;
(2) a real though insufficient attempt to comply with the statute;
(3) acts done by the associates as a corporation. 4 Two public
interests are then found contending for supremacy. The one is
opposed to an unauthorized assumption of corporate existence.
The other is in favor of giving a general assurance of security
in business dealings. In private litigation, the latter preponder-
ates over the former. The former is adequately guarded by the
power of the state to intervene. "Until such interposition [by
the sovereign] the public may treat those possessing and exercis-
ing corporate powers under color of law as doing so rightfully.
The rule is in the interest of the public, and is essential to the
safety of business transactions with corporations." O
When A and corporation X have made a contract, the making
of which was beyond the scope of X's authority, the same two
bublic interests fight a battle royal in the judge's mind. The
one says: "You must prevent these assaults upon the state's pre-
rogative and frown upon X's irregular arrogation of authority" ;
the other says: "You must not permit the plea of ultra vires to
jeopardize the public sense of security in dealing with a corpo-
ration, nor allow the plea to be used by either A or X to work
an injustice to the other." To guard the first of these public
interests, shareholders are permitted to enjoin threatened ultra
vires action, the state can proceed directly against the corpora-
tion whenever any act has been done ultra vires, a wholly exe-
cuted ultra vires transaction will not be undone by the courts,
63Supra note 57, at 373.
04 Snider's Sons v. Troy, 91 Ala. 224, 8 So. 658 (1890); Duggan v. Colo-
rado Co., 11 Colo. 113, 17 Pac. 105 (1887) ; Society Perun v. Cleveland, 43
Ohio St. 481, 3 N. E. 357 (1885). See also supra note 61.
65 Duggan v. Colorado Co., supra note 64, at 115, 17 Pac. 105. For the
distinction between "privilege" and "power" as assisting in explaining the
de facto doctrine, see Harno, op. cit. supra note 8, at 19.
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and, according to the existing authorities, a wholly executory con-
tract will not be enforced by them. Does the protection of this
public interest also require that the defendant in an action upon a
partially executed ultra vires contract shall be permitted to
plead the want of corporate authority to make the contract?
Are there not extenuating circumstances when we find (a) that
the contract is not one that is either illegal or prohibited, but
one simply that X lacked authority to make, and (b) that the
contract, though unauthorized, has been performed by one of
the parties or partially performed by both of them? If the plea
of ultra vires is then allowed to prevail, will it tend to serve the
public by discouraging ultra vires action? Will it not rather
defeat justice?
Here, it is submitted, is the only rational foundation for the
variation in decisions with regard to ultra vires contracts, vary-
ing as the particular contract is one that has been fully executed,
partially executed, or wholly executed. In the judicial labora-
tory, the two public interests are commingled as reagents and
the decision precipitated is determined by the force of the at-
tendant elements peculiar to the particular case.
3. Is the defense of ltra vires rcquircd for the protcetion of
corporate creditors?
It must be first understood that the class to be protected is
made up of those who have become creditors as the result of intra
vires transactions, and also that the defense would be permitted
for their protection only in actions upon contracts which are
either wholly or partially executory. The theory of the intra
vires creditor's right would be that he has contracted with the
corporation relying upon the fact that its assets will not be
risked in ultra vires ventures. There seems to be very little
judicial support for this contention,7 and no case has been found
where a corporate creditor has been permitted to enjoin threat-
ened ultra vires action, except where such action would also
amount to a fraudulent conveyance. 7
66 See, however, In re Amdur Shoe Co., 13 Fed. (2d) 147 (D. .,1ass.
1926); State v. Bank of Hemingford, 58 Neb. 818, SO N. W. 50 (1899);
and dicta in Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche, mepi'd note 5,
at 667, 691. In Perkins v. Trinity Realty Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 723, 131, 61
Atl. 167, 170 (1905) it is said: "Without pttempting to formulate a defi-
nition, I think it may be properly said that the doctrine of ulta vfrca
is that at the instance of the state where public policy requircs it, or at
the instance of stockholders or creditors whose rights would otherwise
be injuriously affected, corporations will be held powerless to do anything
not clearly -within the terms of their charters or statutory provisions. The
cort states, however, that it was not shown that there were any creditors
to be protected.
67 Force v. Age-Herald Co., 136 Ala. 271, 33 So. 866 (1902) ; Ban]: of
BeBrwick v. Vinson Shingle & AIfg. Co., 124 La. 1000, 50 So. 823 (1909);
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In opposition to the alleged right are the following considera-
tions:
(a) The right of the state and of the shareholders to object
to ultra vires conduct is fouild in their contract contained in
the articles of incorporation. A corresponding contract between
the creditor and the corporation is found only by implication and
is then based upon the assumption that the creditor knew and
relied upon the charter limitations upon corporate authority.
That, however, may be a false assumption. Persons dealing
with a corporation may, without bulpability, be unaware of the
limitations upon corporate authority. The rule contended for
would cause a distinction to be made between two equally
innocent corporate creditors, based upon the fortuitous circum-
stance, subsequently developed, that the contract of the one was
intra vires while that of the other was ultra vires.
(b) If the defense of ultra vires were based upon the desire
to protect intra vires creditors, then the defense would be al-
lowed only when the corporation was the party defendant, and
when a judgment against it would result in depleting its assets.
When the corporation was plaintiff, seeking by a recovery to
swell its assets, it would not then be justifiable to permit the
other party to succeed upon a plea of ultra vires. The New York
court laid hold of this distinction in Bath Gas Light Co. v.
Claffy,68 where, referring to the English cases of Ashbury Co. v.
Riche 09 and Macgregor v. Dover & Deal Ry.,70 it said: "It is im-
portant to observe that in each of these cases the action was
brought against the offending corporation . . . and that the
effect of a recovery would have been to divert and appropriate
the funds of the corporation by the actions of the courts, to
unauthorized objects, to the prejudice of . . . stockholders
and creditors." The action then before the New York court
was for the purpose of reimbursing the corporation, and recovery
was allowed. At present, however, the courts make no dis-
tinction between cases in which the corporation is plaintiff and
in which it is defendant; the federal courts, for example, deny
recovery upon the partially executed contract in either case,"
Gullege v. Woods, 108 Miss. 233, 66 So. 536 (1914). In Washington Mill
Co. r. Sprague Lumber Co., 19 Wash. 165, 52 Pac. 1067 (1898) the lan-
guage of the court is broad enough to base the creditors' rights upon the
fact that the transaction was ultra vires, but in fact the transaction was
a fraudulent conveyance. Under the exploded trust fund theory, a credit-
or's right to relief might have been worked out.
6SSupra note 53, at 32, 45 N. E. at 392.
69 Supra note 5.
7018 Ad. & E. 618 (Ex. Ch. 1852).
71 In Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Car Co., supra note 6, the
lease sued upon was ultra vires the plaintiff corporation; while the con-
tract could not be the foundation of an action, the plaintiff was allowed :a
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and the New York courts permit recovery in both cases to the
extent that the plaintiff has performed. -2
(c) It would not seem expedient to establish a rule which
would permit an intra vires creditor, whatever the size of his
claim, to exercise a superintendency over corporate affairs. It
was said in an English case, 73 after finding no precedent for an
injunction against ultra vires action at the suit of a creditor: "It
would be a fearful authority for this Court to assume, for it
would be called on to interfere with the concerns of almost
every company in the kingdom against which a creditor might
suppose that he had demands, which he had not established in
a court of justice, but which he was about to proceed to estab-
lish." Sufficient protection of the public interest against the
usurpation of authority by a corporation would seem to e.:ist
in the right of the state to institute a qzto iaranto proceeding
and the right of the shareholder to enjoin, without conferring a
similar power of superintendency upon creditors. It would seem
clear, therefore, that the ultra vires doctrine is not in reality
governed by a consideration for the rights of intra vires credi-
tors. The decisions certainly cannot be explained on any such
ground.7 4 It would seem also that no corrective legislation is
needed with respect to this phase of the ultra vires problem, but
that in the interest of clarity the restatement might definitely
negative the creditor's right to injunctive relief against ultra
vires t-ansactions. 3
4. Is it beyond the capacity of a corporation to do an ulta
vires act?
Further argument in support of a negative answer to this
question seems now to be superfluous; it would necessitate a
repetition of reasoning already advanced. The negative ansver
was most effectively stated by Mr. George Wharton Pepper in
1898.7r The fundamental theses of this article are: (a) that
quasi-contractual recovery. The federal rule which permits a quasi-con-
tractual recovery against a corporation ignores the interests of intra virez
creditors.
721n Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy, supra note 53, the corporation was
plaintiff, whereas in Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494 (1360) the cor-
poration was defendant, but in each case the plaintiff recovered upon an
ultra vires contract.
73 Mills v. Northern Ry., L. R. 5 Ch. App. 621, G23 (1870).
74 Upon the rights of intra vires creditors in general see: 3 FLTCCn~r,
op. cit. supra note 17, at § 1529; 14A C. J. 33G; 4 Coox, op cit. mpra note
31, at § 735; 3 THOMiPSON, CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1908) § 2850; 2 Monmyrz,
op. cit. supra note 24, at §§ 732, 783, 797-799; Warren, op. cit. spra
note 38, at 541; Carpenter, op. cit. se:pra note 44, at 65.
75 But see the provision in the proposed Canadian uniform corporation
act, infra note 89.




it should be recognized that a group of individuals though in-
corporated can do an unauthorized, or even an illegal, act, and
(b) that the problem of the courts is to determine what legal
consequences should be attributed to such acts. The only essen-
tial difference between articles of incorporation and articles of
partnership is that the former evidences a contract between the
members and the state as well as a contract betwen the members
inter sese. In dealing with unincorporated associations, we
have the problem of protecting only the members against a viola-
tion of their contract, but in dealing with incorporated associa-
tions, we have, in addition, the problem of establishing a suffi-
cient deterrent against the violation of the state's contract with
the members. It has already been suggested that the judicial
process by which decisions are reached, even in federal and
minority state courts, is not one of logical deduction from the
premise of limited corporate capacity, but is one of seeking the
solution which will best serve the public interests 7 The Su-
preme Court itself has said in Salt Lake City v. Hollister,78 "the
argument is unsound that whatever is done by a corporation in
excess of the corporate powers, as defined by its charter, is as
though it was not done at all." Should an unsound argument
continue to be advanced as a reason for a decision? The con-
ception of a corporate entity is rational enough, and it is a con-
ception that has its useful applications. But this spectre of a
fictitious entity, invisible and intangible, should not be permitted
to haunt and control us some two centuries after witchcraft.7
Still, this artificial personality, notwithstanding its physical im-
potence, continues to exist in contemplation with sufficient co-
gency at times to dictate decisions. We have ceased to be im-
pressed by the reasoning that a corporation has not been en-
dowed with the capacity to commit a tort or a crime. Under
77Supra pp. 312-15.
7s Supra note 19, at 260, 6 Sup. Ct. at 1058.
79 achen, Corporate Personality (1911) 24 HAiv. L. Rav. 253, 347, at
260: "All that the law can do is to recognize, or refuse to recognize, the
existence of this entity. The law can no more create such an entity than
it can create a house out of a collection of loose bricks. . . . Hence, it
follows that in recognizing the existence of a corporation as an entity, the
law is merely recognizing an objective fact, while in refusing to recog-
nize fully the existence of a partnership or voluntary association as an
entity the law is shutting its eyes to facts. Therefore, what needs expla-
nation in the common law is not the doctrine that a corporation is an
entity, .but the doctrine that a partnership or other voluntary association
is not an entity."
Warren, op. cit. supra note 28, at 496: "Corporate action unsanctioned
by the sovereign is as real as corporate action sanctioned by the sovereign.
Unauthorized corporate action is as real as authorized corporate action.
The question becomes: Is it ever proper for the judges to act upon the
fiction in the absence of a direction from the sovereign,-is it ever proper
for the judges to give legal validity to unauthorized corporate action?"
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the doctrine of respondeat superior, we hold it responsible for
torts of its agents, even malicious torts, D and permitthe recovery
of punitive damages against it,' and we make it criminally re-
sponsible for the acts of its agents .6 2 According to the majority
view, it may be held responsible for torts committed by its agents
while engaged in an ultra vires undertaldng, : and there is every
reason why it should be criminally responsible for acts of its
agents done while they, under its authority, are engaged in an
ultra vires venture.s4 Why should not the corporation be held
for any ultra vires contracts made for it by its agents, acting
s Dorsey Machine Co. v. IcCaffrey, 139 Ind. 545, 38 N. E. 203 (1894)
(malicious prosecution); Reed v. Home Savings Bank, 130 Mav.o. 443
(1879) (malicious prosecution); Hoboken Printing & Publishing Co. v.
Kahn, 59 N. J. L. 218, 35 Atl. 1053 (MS9G) (libel); Kharas v. Barron
Collier, Inc., 171 App. Div. 388, 157 N. Y. Supp. 410 (1916) (slander);
O'Brien v. Bates Corp., 211 App. Div. 74f), 203 N. Y. Supp. 110 (19253
(libel); Houston Printing Co. v. Jones, 282 S. W. S54 (Tex. 192G)
(libel); authorities collected 7 R. C. L. 683, n. 8.
s1 Kennelly v. Kansas City Ry., 214 S. W. 237 (Mlo. App. 1919); (1919)
33 HARv. L. REV. 111; Corrigan v. Bobbs-2Ierrill Co, 223 N. Y. 53, 126
N. E. 260 (1920) ; (1920) 5 CoRN. L. Q. 303; (1910) 9 Micu. L. R.V. 3,7.
82 State v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 90 N. J. L. 372, 103 AtI. 635 (1917),
aff'd 92 N. J. L. 261, 106 At. 23 (1919), aff'd 94 N. J. L. 171, 111 AtI.
257 (1920) (manslaughter); (1920) 19 BirCH. L. REv. 205; (1920) 5 INN.
L. REv. 74; (1920) 30 YALE LAW JounN.,L, 415; Francis, Ciiiianal RC-
sponsibility of the Corporation (1924) 18 ILL. L. REv. 305. In United
States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 349 Fed. 823, 836 (C. C. N. Y.
1907) an indictment under the Sherman Law, Judge Hough says: "It
seems to me as easy and logical to ascribe to a corporation an evil mind
as it is to impute to it a sense of contractual obligation. There is an
obvious physical difficulty in rendering a corporation amenable to cor-
porate punishment, but there is no more intellectual difficulty in con-
sidering it capable of homicide or larceny than in thinking of it as dc-
vising a plan to obtain usurious interest. . . . The same law that
creates the corporation may create the crime, and to assert that the
Legislature cannot punish its own creature because it cannot moake a
creature capable of violating the law does not, in my opinion, bear
discussion." In United States v. Nearing, 252 Fed. 223, 231 (S. D. N. Y.
1918) a conspiracy to incite insubordination in the army, Judge Learnd
Hand said: "Finally, the defendants urge that a corporation cannot be
guilty of the crime of conspiracy, or of any crime involving specific in-
tent. This question simply turns upon how far the law has gone in im-
puting to a corporation the acts of its agents. . . . It is a question
upon which the law has always tended toward larger and larger lia-
bility. . . . Now, there is no distinction in essence between civil and
criminal liability of corporations, based upon the element of intent or
-wrongful purpose. Each is merely an imputation to the corporation of
the mental condition of its agent. . . . That the criminal liability of a
corporation is to be determined by the kinship of the act to the powers
of the officials, who commit it is true enough, but neither the doctrine of
sltra vires, nor the difficulty of imputing intent or motive, should be re-
garded any longer to determine the result."
s3Supra at 301.
84 Union Colliery Co. v. Queen, supi'a note 24, dictum.
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within the scope of the authority conferred upon them; and cor-
respondingly, why should not the corporation obtain the benefit
of the rights incident to such contracts?
The fallacious conception that a corporation has capacities
limited to those conferred upon it by statute and by its charter
ought to be removed from legal fictions. The conception has its
source, not in the inherent nature of a corporation, but in the
interpretation of legislative will. A common law corporation
has unlimited capacity; a legislatively created corporation can
have unlimited capacity. It is submitted that the legislative
limitation cannot be upon corporate capacity, but may be upon
corporate authority. This distinction was made by the Vermont
legislature in 1915 when it adopted a revised corporation act
which refers to corporate "authority" rather than corporate
"powers." 15
The need for solving the ultra vires problem has held the atten-
tion of Canadian lawyers since the decision in the Bonanza
Creek case in 1916,86 and the method of solution has been the
subject of discussion in the meetings of the Canadiaii Bar As-
sociation. In 1916, that body adopted the following resolution:
"That the Committee in charge be instructed to prepare a draft
Act for submission at the next meeting of the Association, which
will recognize the principles of the doctrine of ultra vires as
suggested by Mr. Robson's paper." 87 In 1919, the same body
adopted a resolution looking in the other direction, and, in effect,
abolishing the conception of limited capacity, and in particular
abolishing the defense of ultra vires in contract actions.88 The
draft presented by the committee in 1922 is printed in the foot-
note."9 No Uniform Corporation Act, however, has as yet been
approved by the Canadian body.
The following provision is suggested for inclusion in a Uni-
form Corporation Act to be submitted to the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws:
85 Supra notes 3 and 13.
86 Supra note 9.
87 (1916) 2 PROCEEDINGS CAN. BAR ASS'N, 19, 185.
88 (1919) 4 ibid. 38-47. See also (1918) 3 ibid. 71-74, 205.
89 (1922) 7 ibid. 382: "1SA. Every company heretofore or hereafter
created, (a) By or under this Act, or by or under any Act for which
this Act was substituted; or (b) By oi under any Act hereafter passed
in substitution or in lieu of this Act; or (c) By or under any general or
special Act of the legislature of the province of .......... , shall, unless
otherwise expressly declared in the Act or instrument creating it, or
in the memorandum of association thereof, have, and be deemed to have
had from its creation, . . . the general capacity which the common
law ordinarily attaches to corporations incorporated by royal charter under
the great seal. .
"15B. Any contract made by a company shall, as between the con-
-120
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I. A corporation which has been formned under this Act, or a
corporation of a class which mnight be foried under this Act,
shall have the capacity to act possessed by an unincorporated
association of natural persons.
I1. The authority of sutch a corporation to act shall be libited
to the performance of those acts which arc necessary or propcr
for the accomplishment of its purposes and which are not re-
pyugnant to law.
The first paragraph, recognizing the fact that a corporation
can do an unauthorized, prohibited or criminal act, extends the
application of the section to corporations of a general business
character formed before this provision became law, but negatives
its application to corporations formed under particular laws,
such as insurance, banldng and public service corporations.
There may be no reason why corporations of the hatter type
should iot be accorded similar treatment, but this is beyond the
scope of a uniform general corporation act, and should be accom-
plished by modelling those special laws.
The phrase "an unincorporated association of natural persons"
is used rather than the phrase "a natural person," as a legisla-
tive recognition of the capacity of the incorporated association
for group action. The two paragraphs together are intended
to make clear the legislature's intention to limit the "authority"
of a corporation and not its "capacity."
5. Is a corporation allowed the defense of ultra vircs in a con-
tract action for the reason that the party dealing with it was
charged with notice of the legal linits upon corporate authowity?
It is frequently found stated in the opinions that there is an
obligation upon anyone contracting with a corporation to talke
notice of the charter limitations upon its authority, and that,
tracting parties and all persons lawfully claiming any right thereunder, be
binding upon the parties thereto, notwithstanding that such contract was
beyond the powers of the company, and in any action brought in any
Court of this Province, upon or in respect of any such contiact, no per-
son shall plead that the contract was beyond the powers of the company.
"Provided, however, that the Court shall have power at the suit of any
shareholder or creditor of a company, to enjoin the company or its
directors or officers from engaging in or attempting to engage in any
business or transaction which is outside the scope of the objects or powers
of the company,
"And provided, further, that any director or officer of the company
who authorizes or consents to the company engaging in any businezs or
transaction which is outside the scope of the objects or powers of the
company, shall be personally liable for any damages sustained by the
company at the suit of the company or any shareholder on behalf of
himself and all other shareholders. . .
Section 15B has been criticized on the ground that it does not protect
the corporation against a third party who was aware that the contract
was ultra vires. Gurd, The Ideal Conzpany Law (1924) 2 CAN. Bru rM.
485, 488.
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therefore, such person has no standing to hold a corporation to a
contract, of the ultra vires nature of which he was bound to
know. 0 In fact, however, decisions are entirely at variance
with the conclusions that would logically result from the adop-
tion of the premise. A holding that a corporation is responsible
for an ultra vires tort can be reconciled with a holding that it is
not responsible for an ultra vires contract, upon the theory that
only the plaintiff in the contract action is charged with notice of
the extent of corporate authority. But the application of th6
same theory would produce inconsistency between a decision that
a corporation is not responsible for a wholly executory
contract, and a decision that it is responsible for a contract
that the plaintiff has performed. Can the plaintiff's
performance eradicate the taint of the guilt with which he
was chargeable before performance? Under the theory of con-
structive notice, a decision that a plaintiff, who has fully per-
formed an ultra vires contract, cannot recover against the corpo-
ration upon that contract (the minority view), could not be
reconciled with a decision that the same plaintiff may, however,
recover against the corporate agents upon an implied warranty
of authority.91 He cannot claim deception as to a fact concern-
ing which he had notice. Similarly, the application of that
theory would make it unreasonable to hold that a plaintiff could
estop the corporation from pleading ultra vires because it had
misled him as to the extent of its authority.9 2  Accordingly, we
find that the courts which at one time assert that one who deals
with a corporation is bound to know the charter limitations upon
its authority, do at other times render decisions in utter dis-
regard of that principle. As a conclusion, we may say that when
90 McCormick v. Market Bank, 61 Ill. App. 33 (1895), aff'd 162 Ill. 100,
44 N. E. 381 (1896), aff'd 165 U. S. 538, 17 Sup. Ct. 433 (1897) ; Carpenter,
op. cit. supra note 44, at 61.
91 In Sanford v. McArthur, 57 Ky. 411 (1857) it was held that the
agent was not liable upon an implied warranty because the plaintiff was
charged with notice of the extent of corporate authority. But in Seeborger
v. McCormick, 178 Ill. 404, 53 N. E. 340 (1899), writ of error dismissed,
175 U. S. 274, 20 Sup. Ct. 128 (1899) the corporate agent was held upon
an implied warranty although in previous litigation the same plaintiff
was denied recovery against the corporation upon the contract, and lim-
ited to quasi-contractual recovery, the Supreme Court assigning as one
reason for its decision the fact that the plaintiff was charged with notice
of the corporate lack of authority. McCormick v. Market Bank, supra
note 90.
92 Steele v. Fraternal Tribunes, 215 Ill. 190, 74 N. E. 121 (1905) where
the representatives of an insured, who had performed, were denied rcovery
upon an ultra vires contract, the court saying that there could be no es-
toppel for the insured could not claim ignorance as to corporate powers.
Acc: Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kastor, 273 Ill. 332, 112 N. E. 988 (1916);
Geraghty v. Washtenaw Fire Ins. Co., 145 Mich. 635, 640, 108 N. W.
1102, 1104 (1906).
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a decision is to be made against the plaintiff who has dealt with
the corporation, he is "charged with constructive notice" of the
ultra vires nature of the transaction; but when it seems fair
that judgment should be in his favor, the defendant is not
allowed to play the constructive notice trump against him. Con-
structive notice may be used to sustain a decision, but it does
not cause one. We must look for some other guiding principle.
The application of the principle of constructive notice has
been held to be unjust where the person dealing with the corpo-
ration could not reasonably be expected to make inquiry; "a
traveller from New York to the Mississippi can hardly be re-
quired to furnish himself with the charters of all the railroads
on his route, or to study a treatise on the law of corporations." 3
Its application has been held to be unjust where the question of
ultra vires is dependent upon a possible construction of an
ambiguity in a statute or the articles of incorporation."1 It has
recently been held that at the most, the rule works only against
those who deal directly with the corporation, and not against one,
for example, who takes a corporate note by indorsement from
a third party, knowing that it was issued in payment of the cor-
poration's ultra vires subscription for shares in another corpora-
tion.95
The application of the doctrine of constructive notice cannot
be supported by analogy to the principle in criminal law that
"everyone is presumed to know the law," or that "ignorance of
the law is no excuse," for ultra vires action is not criminal ac-
tion90 It is believed that the doctrine has found its way into
corporation law partly through the medium of this false analogy,
and partly through an inferred legislative intention. As to the
latter, there is no similarity of purpose between recording acts
and the statutory requirement that articles of incorporation be
filed for record. The very scheme of recording acts makes it
essential to charge the public with notice of the matters recorded.
On the other hand, the purpose of requiring articles of incorpo-
93 Bissell v. Michigan Southern R. R., szipra note 13, at 281.
"Denver Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 9 Colo. 11, 9 Pac. 771 (18S5).
"City Coal & Ice Co. v. Union Trust Co., supa note 38: (1925) 10
CORN. L. Q. 498. Corporation A executed its note to corporation B in
payment of A's subscription to stock in B. B indorsed the note to plain-
tiff who sues A. Plaintiff knew that stock in B was the consideration A
received for the note. Held, that this information put plaintiff "under
no duty to make further inquiry, and the technical rule of concluzive
notice from the charter applies only to parties dealing directly with a
corporation or its officers." City Coal & Ice Co. v. Union Trust Co.,
supra note 38, at 608-609, 125 S. E. at 699.
9s Supra at 309. If the transaction is not merely ultra vires, but un-
lawful or prohibited as well, then the application of the constructive notice
theory is appropriate. Jarsld v. Farmers' & lerchants' Banh, 206 N. W.
773 (N. D. 1925) (contract found to be both ultra vires and unlawful).
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ration to be filed or recorded is no different than the purpose of
requiring the articles of association of a limited partnership or
joint stock company to be filed or recorded. That purpose, it is
submitted, is not to charge the public with notice of the contents
of the paper filed, but to afford the public the opportunity to as-
certain the contents thereof. No case has been found where a
person- dealing with such an unincorporated association, whose
articles have been filed in compliance with the statute, has been
denied relief on the ground that he was charged with notice of
the contents of such articles.9? The rights of such a person
are governed solely by the rules of Agency. Unless the contract
is one that is illegal or prohibited by statute, the state has no
more substantial concern whether it is the contract of a corpo-
ration or the contract of an unincorporated association. If, on
the other hand, the contract is one the making of which is
illegal or prohibited, then the state is as much concerned when it
is the contract of such an unincorporated association as when
it is the contract of a corporation.""
If the principle of constructive notice is not one that really in-
fluences courts' decisions with respect to ultra vires contracts,
what principle should guide them? It is believed that the answer
is that it can be, and should be, that same principle which obli-
gates a third party to ascertain the authority of an agent in the
law of Agency. It was said by the Massachusetts court:
"There is a clear distinction, as was pointed out by Mr. Justice
Campbell in Zabriskie v. Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati Rail-
road, 23 How. 381, 398, by Mr. Justice Hoar in Monument Bank
v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57, 58, and by Lord Chancellor Cairns
and Lord Hatherly in Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. V.
Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 668, 684, between the exercise by a corpora-
97 The Uniform Limited Partnership Law, § 2, requires that there be
filed for record a certificate stating, among other things, the character
of the business to be carried on.
The General Associations Law of New York, Consol. Laws (Cahill,
1923) c. 20, § 4, does not require that the certificate, which must be filed
for record by every joint stock company, shall state the character of the
business to be carried on, but the partnership association laws of Michi-
gan and Pennsylvania do require it. 2 Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) § 7950;
2 Pa. Digest (Purdon's 13th ed. 1905) 2023, 5 ibid. (Supp. 1916) 6483.
The declaration of trust of a business trust must be filed in Massachu-
setts. 2 Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 182. The same was true in Oklahoma.
2 Okla. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1921) § 8466; repealed by 1 Okla. Comp. Stat.
Ann. (1926) § 4194-1.
98 In Howell v. Earp, 21 Hun, 393 (N. Y. 1880) the plaintiff, a creditor
of defendant E, sought to set aside a conveyance made by E to the de-
fendant joint stock company. A statute restricted the right of such an
association to purchase and hold realty not needed for its immediate pur-
poses. It was held that "if the statute is violated, it is the province of
the State to see to its enforcement. Plaintiff is not entitled to break in
and have conveyances declared void in this collateral mode."
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tion of a power not conferred upon it, varying from the objects
of its creation as declared in the law of its organization, of which
all persons dealing with it are bound to take notice; and the
abuse of a general power, or the failure to comply with pre-
scribed formalities or regulations, in a particular instance, when
such abuse or failure is not known to the other contracting
party." 99
That is, it is generally conceded that in those instances, at
least, the party dealing with the corporation may show that he
had reasonable ground to believe that the particular transaction
was intra vires, and that he was not negligent in failing to
ascertain that it was in" fact ultra vires. In Arkansas, it has
been held that a citizen of that state dealing with a foreign
corporation entitled to do business in the state, was not guilty
of negligence in failing to ascertain the charter limitations upon
the corporation's authority, so as to give the corporation a de-
fense in an action upon an ultra vires contract."" The Virginia
court has recently said the same thing, in effect, in holding that
though the indorzee of a corporate note knew that the corporate
maker had executed and delivered the note in payment for its
subscription for shares in another corporation, he was not negli-
gent in failing to inquire whether the maker had authority to
subscribe for and hold shares in another corporation.' "'
Is this not the true method of approach in determining the
rights of persons voluntarily dealing with a corporation; an
application of the same principle which determines the rights of
a third party against the principal in the field of Agency? There
is an obligation upon such persons to use reasonable precautions
to ascertain the authority of the agents with whom they are
dealing. To quote from Professor Blechem's work on Agency:
"An assumption of authority to act as agent for another of itself
challenges inquiry. Like a railroad crossing, it should be in
itself a sign of danger and suggest the duty to 'stop, look and
listen.' "1.2 That statement is as much applicable in the case of
corporate agents as in the case of an individual or an unincorpo-
rated group of individuals. The apparent scope of the authority
of a corporate agent may exceed the charter limits of its author-
ity, either by the assent of the shareholders, express or implied,
or by implication from the knowledge that the corporation has
authority if certain facts exist or if certain formalities are com-
plied with. In the Monment National BaWn case, - 3 the con-
tract was actually ultra vires, but the question of corporate
90 Davis v. Old Colony R. R., svpra note 43, at 260.
1oo Minneapolis Fire Ins. Co. v. Norman, 74 Ark. 190, 85 S. W. 229
(1905).
101 Supra note 38.
102 1 MECHrm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 743.
13 ionument Nat'l Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57 (1869).
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authority depended upon the existence of certain acts peculiarly
within the knowledge of the corporate agents. The principle
there applied is identical with that applied when a local freight
agent, in direct violation of his instructions, issued a bill of lad-
ing before the goods had been delivered to him for shipment.
1 4
Though a principal may, upon diverse grounds, be responsible
for the acts of an agent done in excess of the authority actually
conferred upon the agent, one established limitation is that a
third party who knew, or, as a reasonably prudent man, ought
to have known that the agent was acting in excess of his au-
thority may not hold the principal responsible. So any person
dealing with corporate agents must exercise that diligence to
ascertain the limits of the agent's authority which the ordinarily
prudent man would exercise under similar circumstances. In
principle it matters not whether the transaction is intra vires or
ultra vires; whether the limitation upon the agent's authority is
found in the charter or in the by-laws. But in fact, those differ-
ences are of vital importance. The conduct of the reasonably
prudent man will depend largely upon the accessibility of the
information concerning the extent of the authority; the law re-
quiring the articles to be filed has made the information therein
contained available for one who is geographically near to the
places of filing.105  By-laws, usually being corporate records,
closed to outsiders, are treated as secret limitations upon the
authority of corporate agents.
The point is forcefully illustrated by a recent development in
the law of Pennsylvania. In Putnam v. Ensign Oil Co.,"', one of
the corporation's defenses to a suit upon its promissory note was
that the note was signed by the treasurer and secretary, instead
of by the president and secretary as required by the company's
by-laws. The court said:
"Pennsylvania has adhered to the rule that the by-laws of a
corporation are written into the charter, defining and limiting
the rights, duties and powers of its officers, and places persons
dealing with the corporation on notice as to the extent of the
officers' power and agency . . . The reason for the Pennsyl-
vania rule is a desire to protect stockholders in every possible
way against mismanagement of corporate business; but the
1o4 Armour v. Michigan R. R., 65 N. Y. 111 (1875); Bank of Batavia
v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., 106 N. Y. 195, 12 N. E. 433 (1887);
MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 102, §§ 757-62.
105 Warren, op. cit. supra note 38, at 540: "It is submitted that the
courts should not require persons contracting with corporations to as-
certain at their peril the contemplated scope of corporate action, unless
the nature of the corporation and the contract make such requirement
reasonable. (The subsidiary facts being found, the ultimate question
whether, on such facts, such a requirement is reasonable should be for
the court to determine.)"
106 272 Pa. 301, 307-9, 116 Atl. 285, 287 (1922).
DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES
proposition is no doubt sound that the business world, constitut-
ing by far the greater number of persons interested in the
security and integrity of certain commercial acts, may be, and
no doubt is, injuriously affected by the continuation of such
rule. When our rule was adopted corporations were not so
numerous; at present they have taken hold of the vast majority
of business enterprises of the country . The question
becomes pertinent, Where an individual is held for acts of this
agent, done within the apparent scope of authority, why should
a group of individuals, as a corporation, stand in any different
position?"
This decision in 1922 was approved by the court in 1923,1,7 but
the suggestion in the earlier case that there was need for legisla-
tive improvement of the law, produced the enactment of this
provision in 1925: los
"The by-laws of any corporation organized or doing business
within the Commonwealth shall operate merely as regulations
among members or stockholders of the corporation and shall
have no effect upon contracts or other dealings with other
persons unless such persons shall have actual kmowledge of such
by-laws."
As the public was entitled to be relieved from the effect of
the former Pennsylvania rule of constructive notice of by-laws,
so the public is entitled to be relieved from the effect of the
rule, now more honored in the breach than in the observance, that
it is charged with notice of the contents of the corporate
charter. The corporate body is not entitled to the unqualified
protection which that rule would give it; but is entitled to protec-
tion against persons, who in dealing with corporate agents, are
culpably negligent and fail to ascertain that the transaction con-
templated exceeds the authority conferred upon the agents. Nor
do the interests of the public require the application of the rule.
The interest which the public has in preventing the usurpation
of authority by the corporation, fades beside the interest of the
public that there shall be a feeling of security in dealing with
corporations. The result of litigation evidences this.
Just as in Pennsylvania, constructive notice of by-laws became
the rule because of a supposed legislative intent, and corrective
legislation became necessary, so the doctrine of constructive
notice of the contents of corporate charters also deserves to be
1 07 Millar v. Grieb & Thomas, Inc., 276 Pa. 372, 120 Atl. 390 (1923)
(action upon an alleged contract for services).
3.0 Pa. Laws 1925, No. 329, § 1. Only the first of the two sections of
the act is quoted. See a similar provision in Georgia. 2 Ga. Ann. Code
(Parks, 1915) § 2225. In Dinsmore v. Nat'l Hardwood Co., 203 N. W.
701, at 702 (Mich. 1926) it was recently held that under the Michigan
sale of securities act, "representations to the commission are not intended
for the prospective purchaser [of shares], and, unless he kmows and relic3
upon them when he purchases, it cannot be advanced that he was in any
-way influenced by them."
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neutralized by the enactment of a legislative antidote. So far as
that doctrine derives its vitality from a presumption of legisla-
tive intention, it will wither if the legislature gives expression
to its actual intention. The rules of Agency would still be left
free play, with the result that the third party who has entered
into an ultra vires contract, would fail to recover only when it
could be said that, as a reasonably prudent man, he should have
acquired knowledge of the material facts as to corporate author-
ity recorded, both for his benefit and for the protection of the
shareholders.1° That phase of the problem could be clarified in
the restatement, but legislation is needed to remove a technical
premise which the majority of American jurisdictions now ignore
when justice so demands it. Such a statutory provision would
not reform the law, but would make for consistency in the de-
cisions of a given state, and for uniformity in the decisions of
the courts of different states. Accordingly, the following pro-
vision is proposed for inclusion in a Uniform Corporation Act:
The filing of articles of incorporation, or amendments thereto,
and of any other papers,"i0 pursuant to the provisions of this
Act, is required for the purpose of affording all persons the
opportunity of acquiring knowledge of the contents thereof, and
not for the purpose of charging them with notice of the contents
thereof.
6. Is the defense of ultra vires required for the protection of
the rights of shareholders?
It would seem that there can be no doubt that the answer to
this question must be in the affirmative. Besides being a contract
between the state and the incorporators and their assigns, the
charter is a contract between the associates themselves, limiting
the purposes for which they have combined their capital and the
character of the business to be carried on therewith.
Collateral attack upon the authority of a corporation to con-
tract with outsiders is not needed for the protection of intra
vires creditors; they have their remedies for fraudulent convey-
ances and for prohibited returns of capital to shareholders. If
a contract is neither illegal nor prohibited, but only ultra vires,
then it does not so offend the public interest that collateral attack
is required. However, non-assenting shareholders are to be pro-
tected. But if all shareholders have assented to a given ultra
109 See the interesting discussion in Sturdevant v. Farmers' & Merchants'
Bank, 62 Neb. 472, 87 N. W. 156 (1901) and affirming opinion in 69 Neb.
220, 95 N. W. 819 (1903).
110 Corporation statutes require other statements, or affidavits, to be
filed, e. g., with regard to the allotment and payment of shares. Since the
requirement of filing is in each instance for the same purpose, to make
information available for the public, there is no reason for confining the
statement of this purpose to the articles of incorporation and amendments
thereto.
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vires transaction, they are not entitled to the defense that the
contract is ultra vires.
The fact that an act done on the behalf of a corporation is
ultra vires gives rise to two questions: first, shall the act be given
legal consequences as a corporate act unless all shareholders have
assented; second, shall legal consequences be attributed to it as
a corporate act even if all shareholders have assented to it?
The solution of the first question is to be reached by applying the
principles of the law of Agency; the solution to the second
question has involved the additional application of certain princi-
ples peculiar to the law of Corporations: (a) the public policy
against corporate usurpation of authority without the assent of
the state; (b) the doctrine of limited capacity; and (c) the
doctrine of constructive notice. The last two should be removed
by statute; the first is more than neutralized by the public inter-
est in the security of business transactions.
It is realized that a "corporate act" is a fiction in the same
sense that it is fictitious to speak of the act of an agent as the
act of his principal. Yet the fiction is a convenient symbol of the
process of reasoning by which we reach the result that the corpo-
ration ought to be held responsible for, or given the advantage
of the act of another."' When incorporated associates procure
an act to be done for them by another, or ratify an act that has
been done on their behalf, the act is no less a corporate act
because it is done ultra vires. As partners can make an act done
outside the business agreed upon in the articles of partnership
their act, so incorporated associates can act in excess of the
authority conferred in the articles of incorporation. The apt-
ness of the analogy was emphasized by Chief Judge Comstock
in the Bissell case.
1 2
A corporation is not responsible for its agent's acts done by
him while acting in excess of the apparent scope of the authority
conferred upon him. An ultra vires act is not only in excess of
1M Holmes, Agency (1891) 4 HARV. L. RlNv. 345, 351: "The fiction is
merely a convenient way of ex\pressing rules which were arrived at on
other grounds. . . . But when such a formula is adopted, it soon ac-
quires an independent standing of its own. Instead of remaining only a
.short way of saying that when from policy the law makes a master respon-
sible for his servant, or because of his power gives him the benefit of his
slave's possession or contract, it treats him to that c..'tcnt as the tort-feasor,
possessor, or contractee, the formula becomes a reason in itself for making
the master answerable and for giving him rights." See also 2 MOMwDrz,
op. cit. supra, note 24, at § 732.
"2'Supra note 13, at 263-4: It is untrue to say that "these artificial
existences are cast in so perfect a mould, that transgression and wrong
become impossible . . . like natural persons, they can overleap the
legal and moral restraints imposed upon them: in other words, they are
capable of doing wrong." Ibid. at 270-1: "Now, in a well-regulated un-
incorporated partnership, the articles entered into by the aszociates specify
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the authority conferred by the state upon the corporation, but is
primarily in excess of the authority conferred by the corpora-
tion upon its agent.11 3  It is submitted that the legal effect of
acts done on behalf of a corporation should be determined accord-
ing to the principles of the law of Agency; and that, in this re-
spect, there is no substantial difference in the principles to be
applied whether the principal for whom certain persons, called
directors, have acted was a joint stock company or a corpora-
tion.114 As the corporation may authorize an act intra vires but
beyond the usual scope of directors' authority, so the corporation
may authorize or ratify an act which is ultra vires and, there-
fore, primarily beyond the scope of the directors' authority."'
What constitutes corporate ratification? The true answer has
been given by Morawetz:
"Ratification by a corporation of an act in excess of its charter,
the object of their association. But, suppose the same associates desire
a charter of incorporation for the more convenient prosecution of the
same business, and obtain one. We shall find it to contain the like
specification, which becomes the grant of power from the sovereign au-
thority of the state. . . . The charter takes the place of the articles
of agreement, and becomes the appropriate rule of action. No public
interest or policy is involved, because the objects of the grant are not
of a public nature; the powers and rights specified are identical with
those which any private person or association of persons may exercise. If
those who manage the concerns of a simple partnership deal with the funds
in a manner or for purposes not specified, their acts are ultra vires; and
if the directors of such a corporation as I am here speaking of, do the same
thing, their acts are also ultra vires in the same sense and no other."
113 Richard Hanlon Millinery Co. v. Miss. Valley Trust Co., 251 Mo. 553,
570, 158 S. W. 359, 361 (1913): "The defense of ultra vires is, there-
fore, bottomed upon a wise public policy to protect the stockholders (the
real body of the corporation) from the acts of their own agents, where
such agents clearly do acts or make contracts beyond the charter powers
and rights of the corporation." But the court based its decision upon the
doctrines of limited capacity and constructive notice.
14 In Rianhard v. Hovey, 13 Ohio, 300, 302-3 (1844) it is said with
regard to the ultra vires acts of the directors of a joint stock company:
"First: That as to all creditors who have dealt with the directors and
agents of the association in good faith, without a knowledge of their
departure from the original objects of the association, that all stockholders
are liable upon the principle of copartnership liability. . . . Fourth:
That all those who have dealt, knowingly, with the directors and agents
of the company, in matters not coming within the scope and objects of
the associates, have no claim to call upon any of the stockholders, save
those who were cognizant of the manner in which the agents and directors
were conducting, and by their silence or direct action assented to and
ratified their acts. It is a wholesome rule that should be applied in a
case like this--that where a member of a copartnership, whose agents are
daily exceeding their authority, stands by and makes no objection at the
proper time, he will be considered as agreeing to the acts of the agent,
and will not be listened to in equity when it becomes his interest to assert
the contrary."
115 When an ultra vires transaction has been assented to by all share-
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means ratification by the entire body of shareholders; no agent
of a corporation has authority to ratify an act which he had
not original authority to do" - . "If the shareholders,
who constitute the corporate association, unanimously acquiesce
in or ratify an act performed by an agent or board on behalf of
the corporation, no further question as to the extent of the
powers delegated to the agent or board can arise. Ratification
by all the shareholders would not cure the illcgality of an act
which is prohibited by the common law or by statute; but it
would remove any defect of authority in the agent performing
the act, as between himself and the company. After such rati-
fication, the company would become chargeable with the act to
the same extent as if it had originally authorized it to be
done." 117
Some may shrink from the thought that corporate ratification
of an ultra vires act involves the unanimous assent of the share-
holders. However, the principles of the law of Agency take care
of the situation, and while the principles apply equally to corpo-
rate and natural principals, the facts upon which ratification
may be predicated may differ. It is common knowledge that in
large corporations a substantial proportion of the shareholders
may not be interested in, and may even be apathetic toward the
management of corporate affairs. Under such circumstances,
either a ratification might be based upon a silent acquiescence,
or proof of an intention not to ratify might be excluded because
of laches. If shareholders are negligently inattentive to corpo-
rate affairs, the scope of the authority delegated by them may be
held to be extended by reason of such negligence."58 To quote
from two leading works on Agency: "'The scope of an agency
is to be determined not alone from what the principal may have
told the agent to do, but from what he knows, or in the exercise
of ordinary care and prudence ought to know, the agent is doing
in the transaction.' " 19 "Where a principal conducts his affairs
holders, the corporation cannot succeed on the defense of ultra vires. Lin-
coln Court Realty Co. v. Kentucky Title Co., 169 Ky. 340, 183 S. W. 156
(1916); Perkins v. Trinity Realty Co., supra note 66.
116 2 MORAWETZ, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 531.
117 2 ibid. § 623.
1s MoAW Tz, op. cit. supra note 24, at §§ 618-639. Denver Fire Ins.
Co. v. McClelland, supra note 94, at 25, 9 Pac. at 779: ". . . we think,
on principle and the weight of modern decisions, that if the stoclkoldero,
whose business it is to see that their own managing officers act within
the proper scope of their powers, either expressly or by silence implicdly,
assents to acts done on their behalf in excess of authority, they should be
held estopped to deny that such acts were authorized." See, in addition,
In re Amdur Shoe Co., supra note 66 (ratification of accommodation in-
dorsement based on silent acquiescence of all shareholders with knowledge) ;
Olson v. Warroad Mercantile Co., 136 Mlinn. 310, 161 N. W. 713 (1917);
Bissell v. Michigan R. R., supra note 13, at 275. See dicta in Citizens
Bank v. Valdosta Mill & Elevator Co., 34 Ga. App. 713, 131 S. E. 126
(1925); Black Hawk Bank v. Monarch Co., 207 N. W. 121 (Iowa, 1926).
119 1 MECHEMi, op. cit. supra note 102, at § 755.
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so negligently as to lead third persons to reasonably suppose that
his agent has full powers, then, if the agent exceeds his author-
ity, the principal must bear the loss." 120
The explanation commonly advanced by state courts for hold-
ing a corporation upon a partially executed contract is that a
plaintiff who has fully performed his part of the contract may
"estop" the corporation from pleading ultra .vires as a defense. 12 1
It is submitted that this is an erroneous use of the term "estop-
pel," 122 and that the corporation should be bound only when the
conduct in accepting the benefits amounts to a ratification, or is
such that the corporation is guilty of laches in not repudiating.
As for the third party, he is not held upon the principle of
estoppel; he has not misled the corporation as to the extent of
its own authority. Though the contract was normally one beyond
the scope of the authority of corporate agents, the third party
will be bound either because in the particular instance it was
authorized by the body of shareholders or ratified by them, if
not by any previous act, then by the act of beginning suit.123
The variety of the circumstances from which ratification,
estoppel, negligence or laches may be inferred is so infinite that
it would be unwise to attempt to formulate a statutory rule to
control decisions upon this aspect of the ultra vires problem.
The principles now exist in the common law and are being satis-
factorily applied to cases of ultra vires corporate action. A third
party dealing with a corporate agent, who is acting within the
120 WHARTON, COMMENTARY ON AGENCY (1876) § 123.
121 Denver Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, supra note 94; Schlitz Brewing
Co. v. Poultry & Game Co., 287 Mo. 400, 229 S. W. 813 (1921) where the
estoppel was allowed notwithstanding Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) § 9749 and
§ 169-art. 12 of the Constitution-which says that "no corporation shall
engage in business other than that expressly authorized in its charter or
the law under which it may have been or may hereafter be organized.
." Chafin v. Main Island Co., 85 W. Va. 459, 463, 102 S. E. 291,
293 (1920). Cf. Hind v. Cook & Co., supra note 47 (no estoppel because
the contract was expressly prohibited). The authorities are collected
in 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. "supra note 17, at § 1547 et seq. Courts adhering
to the theory of limited capacity hold that there can be no estoppel. See
the authorities collected in 14A C. J. 323, n. 97. And no ratification by
the corporation. 14A C. J. 316, n. 59. But see Welsh v. Bruce Sowing
Machine Co., 223 Ill. App. 467 (1921), certiorari denied 226 Ill. App.
XXXVIII (1923).
122 Harris v. Independence Gas Co., supra note 38.
123 Olson v. Warroad Mercantile Co., supra note 118, places the decision
both upon estoppel and authorization. BiGELOW, op. cit. supra note 23, at
501-504, adhering to the view that a corporation lacks capacity to do an
ultra vires act, asserts that while a corporation may not be estopped from
denying its capacity, the third party may be estopped, since "a man can-
-not set up the incapacity of the third party with whom he has contracted
in bar of an action by that party for breach of the contract. Legal dis-
ability generally, as e. g., in the case of an infant, is a defense personal
to him who is under it, and cannot be made use of by another."
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apparent scope of his authority, should be able to recover against
the corporation even though the particular contract be ultra
vires; but a third party who negligently fails to ascertain that
the agent is acting both beyond the scope of his authority and the
scope of corporate authority, should not be permitted to recover
against a non-assenting corporate principal. If a corporate body
has authorized or ratified an ultra vires contract, neither it nor
the third party should be permitted to attack the corporation's
authority to make the contract. The restatement of the law of
Agency may be expected to furnish what revision seems neces-
sary, and the pertinent provisions of such restatement could be
made applicable to corporations by including them in the re-
statement of the law of Business Corporations.
It may be urged by some that we should go to a furth r ex-
tieme by establishing it as law that all acts of the board of di-
rectors shall be considered corporate acts, even though ultra
vires. The justification for this would be that in practice share-
holders, especially in large corporations, do not interest them-
selves in corporate activities and consequently ought not be per-
mitted to upset a transaction by establishing their ignorance of
it as proof that they had not assented to it. The Vermont statute
seems to go this far.12  But instead of establishing this rule by
statute, is it not better to leave the question dependent upon the
flexibility of the rules of Agency? The very method of share-
holders' participation in the affairs of a large corporation fur-
nishes the facts upon which to predicate authorization or ratifi-
cation by negligence, or laches and perhaps estoppel. Justice is
reached by applying these principles to the facts. On the other
hand, if the corporation is a private family affair, or one of
moderate size, shareholders who can establish their alert atten-
tion to corporate affairs, ought to be able to disavow ultra vires
transactions, if they have not been negligent in ascertaining the
124 Vt. Laws 1915, No. 141, § 15: "If any act is done in behalf of a
corporation, and such act is authorized or ratified by the directors or trus-
tees, or such act is done within the scope of authority given by the
directors or trustees, such act shall (provided that a corporation with au-
thority to do such an act might at the time such act was done have been
formed under the laws of this state) be regarded as the act of the cor-
poration and the corporation shall be liable therefor, even if such act was
not necessary or proper to accomplish its purposes, to the same extent
that it would have been liable for such act if the act had been necessary
or proper to accomplish its purposes." If the directors act intra virez,
but in excess of the apparent scope of the authority conferred upon them,
the corporation will not be liable. Does it follow from the last clauce
of the above provision that, therefore, the corporation will not be liable if
the ultra vires act of the directors was beyond the scope of the au-
thority conferred upon them by the corporation? If not, is it just that
directors should have a greater power to bind the corporation in ultra
vires matters than in intra vires matters?
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facts and acting upon them when discovered. We grant this
much to shareholders with respect to transactions which are
intra vires but done in excess of the authority conferred by them
upon the directors. Is it just, then, to deny them the right to
repudiate acts which have been done entirely beyond the scope
of corporate purposes?
CONCLUSION
It is to be remembered that the foregoing discussion is based
upon these two assumptions: (a) that an ultra vires act is
merely one that a corporation is unauthorized to do by its charter
and by the statutes which regulate it-the expression does not
apply to an act which is prohibited or one that is illegal; (b) that
the recommendations made are intended here to be confined in
their application to corporations formable under general busi-
ness corporation laws, though it is believed that the same recom-
mendations might properly be applied to the classes of corpora-
tions formable under special statutes, such as banking, insur-
ance and public service corporations.
With those limitations in mind, it is submitted that the adop-
tion of the recommendations here made would produce but one
change in the results now reached by courts in the great major-
ity of American jurisdictions. The one change would result
from the fact that no distinction is here made between contracts
which are still wholly executory and other contracts. It is argu-
able that the rule that executory ultra vires contracts are not
enforceable operates to discourage the making of ultra vires
contracts. Perhaps it would in those instances where both
parties are aware that a contemplated contract will be ultra
vires, but its application works injustice where the fact of ultra
vires is not present to the consciousness of either party and
where that fact is later used by one of them as a last ditch of
defense. In the latter case, the ethical position of the parties
is no worse than when the contract has been partially or fully
performed. The hardship upon the plaintiff in not being able to
recover damages is no less when he has not performed than
when he has. While the contract should be the foundation for an
action for damages, we should rely upon the discretion of a court
of equity to grant or withhold specific performance as the
justice of the particular case seems to demand. 125 The principles
of Agency apply to contracts whether they are executory or
executed, so that a third party, negligent in failing to ascertain
the directors' breach of authority, could not recover against non-
assenting shareholders, but a third party could recover against
125 Cf. Case v. Kelly, 133 U. S. 21, 10 Sup. Ct. 216 (1890) ; Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 214 N. Y. 488, 108 N. E. 856 (1915); Fayette Land
Co. v. L. & N. R. R., 93 Va. 274, 24 S. E. 1016 (1896).
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the corporation upon a showing of authorization, ratification or
laches on the part of the body of shareholders.
No legislation is needed to give the state a right to institute a
quo warranto proceeding, a shareholder the right to enjoin, or
the corporation the right to recover from its agents such damage
as it may sustain in consequence of ultra vires transactions
undertaken by them. No legislation is needed with regard to the
responsibility of a corporation for a tort committed in an ultra
vires transaction, with regard to the validity of a title taken by a
corporation in excess of its authority, or to the rights
acquired under an ultra vires contract fully performed. The
proposed recommendations will not unsettle the law with respect
to these questions, but rather will reinforce the existing decisions
and give them a more rational foundation. A restatement would
set forth these rules which are so well established.
The narrow field of existing conflict is limited to cases arising
out of partially executed contracts. Of the six grounds advanced
in support of permitting collateral attack upon corporate author-
ity in this field, it has been shown that authority and reason are
opposed to permitting collateral attack in the interests of intra
vires creditors, that unauthorized corporate action is not to be
regarded as illegal corporate action, and that the public policy
in favor of honesty and a feeling of security in dealing with
corporations is thrown in the balance against the public policy
against corporate incursions into unauthorized fields. Two of
the other grounds, the doctrine of constructive notice and the
doctrine of limited capacity, would be eliminated by the proposed
legislation. The final ground for collateral attack, that the
defense of ultra vires is required for the protection of the body
of shareholders, means only that we have the problem of deter-
mining when an act done by corporate agents shall be considered
a "corporate act," notwithstanding that the act is one which the
corporation is unauthorized to do. The determination of that
problem depends upon the application of principles familiar to
the law of Agency.
The abolition of the doctrine of limited capacity and the aboli-
tion of the doctrine of constructive notice should come tlhrough
legislative enactment. Further legislation than this upon the
ultra vires problem would seem to be unnecessary. A codifi-
cation of the residue might be attempted, but in codification lurks
the danger of omission. The legislation which has been proposed
would remove the two sources of greatest confusion, the chief
obstacles to uniformity in decisions. The application of the
principles of Agency, estoppel and laches to the facts of a particu-
lar ultra vires transaction ought to be set forth in a restate-
ment of the law of Business Corporations; the rigidity of legisla-
tive rules and fixed classifications should be avoided.
